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Abstract 
In this paper we address the paradox of increasing income inequality and the absence of 
public mobilization around the issue. As the mass media are our most important source of 
information on wider economic affairs, we examine the salience and framing of income 
inequality within major UK and US newspapers over the period 1990 – 2015.  Despite an 
initial surge in media attention and again towards the end of the period, the issues-attention 
cycle of inequality resembles a hype-cycle that is more common with arcane academic or 
techno-scientific topics than with social mobilisation. The dominant frames present income 
inequality as the seemingly inevitable result of globalization, market forces and technological 
change. No new radical frames of economic injustice have emerged, neither have any new 
actors, and so policy solutions fall back onto existing left-right approaches.  
SER Key words: income distribution; inequality; media; discourse; United Kingdom, USA 
JEL classification: J3 Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs 
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1. Introduction 
Since the 1980s, income inequality has reached historic highs within many of the countries 
that make up the OECD (OECD 2015). Among these countries, the largest increases were 
in the liberal market economies of the English speaking world, notably in the UK and the USA 
where the GINI co-efficient rose by more than 30 per cent in the years between 1979 and 
1991-2 (Smeeding 2005: 963). Significantly, this rise in income inequality has not been 
accompanied by any noticeable shift in public attitudes over the past few decades. Drawing 
on cross-national survey data, Mijs (2019) finds that attitudes towards income inequality have 
remained extraordinarily steady between 1987 and 2009 in the UK and the USA; the public 
outcry barely reached three percentage points for both countries (UK: 72.4% in 1987; 75.2% 
in 2009; USA 73.0% in 1987, and 69.1% in 2009).  
Against this background, we examine why we have yet to see a ‘Tawney moment’ for income 
inequality: the moment when inequality is publicly recognised as a scandalous evil, and 
named as such, and indifference towards inequality is overcome by public outcry (Tawney 
1964 [1931]: 33ff). In our graphic we schematise this hypothetical ‘Tawney moment’ as the 
confluence of market problems and academic analysis, which at some definable moment 
opens up a new issue in society, throwing the spotlight onto the intolerable disparity of ‘rich 
and poor’.  
Figure 1: The Tawney moment schematised 
 
  
Notes: inequality is initially a matter of economic analysis under market conditions; once ‘inequality’ 
becomes scandalous in what we call the ‘Tawney moment’ the issue turns into a political problem of 
‘rich and poor’ in society 
 
One potential answer to the question of the lack of public attitude change is that the public 
lacks awareness of the magnitude of income inequality in their society. A growing body of 
research indicates that ordinary people do not know the general level of income inequality, 
how it has changed in recent decades or where they fit in the income distribution (Engelhardt 
and Wagener 2017; Gimpelson and Treisman 2018). As McCall (2013) has argued, limited 
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information makes it difficult for individuals to appreciate trends in economic inequality or to 
recognize it as a social problem. The existence of this perception gap raises questions about 
where people get information about inequality as well as about the content of that information. 
Aside from personal experience and talking to friends and family, the mass media are also a 
significant source of information on economic affairs. Certainly, the portfolio of news sources 
that people consult is changing over time, with radio, television, and recently social media, 
challenging the dominance of newspapers as daily news source; this follows the sequential 
penetration of households with radio, TV, telephone, home computers and mobile devices 
over the 20th century (Gordon 2017: 416, 432).  
Considering the importance of mass media in drawing attention to economic affairs and 
making salient issues in the public sphere, we focus on examining how the mass media might 
elicit public awareness of income inequality. Despite the emergence of social media since 
2000, we focus our attention on print media. In addition to giving us continuity in a data 
source, the traditional print media retain a significant role in the formation of public opinion 
despite the strains on their business model (ACCC 2019: 279ff). Some years ago Bartels 
(1996) found that newspapers led the political agenda though there is some variation 
depending on the status of the paper. TV news played a mediating role but the major 
newspapers set the agenda more often than not. Similar observations pertain to the function 
of newsprint in the age of social media: many readers consult legacy news media on social 
media, or they take the cue from preferred social media sites and follow-up with newsprint 
(Dutton et al. 2013; Mitchell 2018). Also, as social media platforms are increasingly 
associated with ‘fake news’ and low trust (Newman 2017), there are numerous initiatives to 
shore up print media as brokers of quality information in the public sphere (ACCC 2019).     
 
2. Literature review: much inequality in the world, but no moral alarm 
If we are to understand why the public have not reacted more strongly to rising levels of 
income inequality we need to get measures of its visibility and packaging within the mass 
media. Remarkably, there are hardly any studies of how the media report income inequality, 
despite the huge increase in academic research on the topic in the past 25 years (McCall 
and Percheski 2010). Following McCall (2013), we examine how the media can shape public 
awareness by first drawing attention to a social problem, which is indicated by the rise and 
decline in salience of a news topic, and secondly by explaining how the issue should be 
understood by the public, which is indicated by the framing of the topic taking into 
consideration the emotional tone of the content and the key sponsors. Both salience and 
framing are conditions of defining a social problem. We consider the literature on these two 
topics below. 
Media salience and hype cycles 
How do we know that an issue becomes a social problem? One indicator is the degree of 
media attention. By increasing topic salience, the media move an issue from the margins to 
mainstream public attention, thus rendering a problem less ambiguous, legitimate and part 
of routine conversation (Strodthoff et al. 1985). The mass media recruit public attention and 
create, as demonstrated on environmental news, an ‘issue-attention cycle’ (Downs 1972). 
More recently, this is also modelled as ‘hype cycle’ – tracing the hyperbole that often 
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accompany techno-scientific developments such as gene therapy – which turns a vice (i.e. 
creating hyperbole) into a virtue (Van Lente et al. 2013). The power of an attention-cycle lies 
in the agenda setting effect as it first moves an issue from sponsor-actors to mass media 
attention, and then from media attention to public perceptions and issue salience which in 
turn creates urgency of political action down the line (McCombs and Shaw 1972). 
However, the processing capacity of the mass media is limited by the amount of airtime or 
the number of printed pages, and topics are selected because they either land a scoop (a 
first) or because rivals are also covering the issue (herding). Competition and limited capacity 
in combination with the boredom of readers reading about the same issue day on day, leads 
to an unstable flow of news topics, or what Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) call the rise and fall of 
social problems.   
One of the most studied examples of an issue cycle is the ‘environment’ as an issue of public 
concern (Djerf-Pierre 2013). Bauer (2015) argues that environmental attention saw at least 
four cycles since the 1950s, moving from water and air pollution to over-population in the 
1960s, to environmental disasters such as the Chernobyl nuclear accident, oil spills and 
chemical releases in the 1980s, and then via the ozone hole and global warming to climate 
change of today. An early review by Lowe and Goyder (1983: 32) found this attention was 
indeed episodic as proposed by Downs (1972) ‘issue-attention cycle’. The authors show that 
attention to environment occurred during sustained periods of economic expansion and 
relative prosperity, and due to the alarm/fear created by dramatic environmental events (e.g., 
the heat and drought of the summer of ’88). Critically, each of these factors specifies the 
extra-media context, that is, to the wider socio-economic situation that gives resonance to a 
topic. Similar attention cycles can be found in relation to global warming (Mazur and Lee 
1993), socio-political issues of globalisation (Fiss and Hirsch 2005), and emergent 
technologies such as biotechnology (Bauer and Gaskell 2002).  
On the topic of income inequality, there is limited research examining the presence of an 
attention cycle in the mass media. McCall (2013), with a focus on the United States, is an 
exception. Drawing on articles from mainstream US periodicals, McCall found little evidence 
of a general rise in media attention over the period 1980 to 2010. The period is significant 
because it includes both the sharp rise in income equality and the start of a surge of academic 
interest on the topic. Though she acknowledges that the coverage came in waves, it was, 
however, no greater at the end of the period than it was at the beginning. McCall attributes 
the lack of sustained and meaningful media interest to three factors: income inequality is an 
abstract concept that is difficult to explain to the average citizen; the difficulty that people 
have in considering the normative implications of income inequality and, relatedly, the 
inherently controversial nature of the most obvious remedy, namely income redistribution. 
In sum, media attention is important in turning a previously neglected issue that might exist 
in the specialist margins into a scandalous social problem that features in the mainstream 
media. But the analysis of media salience and its structure is not sufficient on its own; we 
must also consider how journalists make sense of and represent income inequality when they 
draw attention to it.  
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3. Media framing and sentiment 
Framing shows how the mass media create meaning in society, guide audiences how to think 
about inequality and thus release or build political pressure. Beyond the art metaphor, that 
every picture needs a frame, golden, wooden or otherwise, the ‘frame’ is generally considered 
a story line that defines a problem and offers a possible solution. It defines the problem X as 
A, an axis of disagreement, and offers a solution B; it links a diagnosis to treatment, and it 
apportions blame; and thus presents a collective action-schema that links the problem to 
what needs to be done and who is the culprit (Entman 2004). A frame is therefore a meaning 
package that allows a succinct definition of the problem, anchored in metaphorical terms and 
objectified in images and iconic concretisations as Gamson and Modigliani (1989) have 
demonstrated over nuclear energy. Experimental evidence on how inequality is framed, in 
terms of what language is used to discuss it, has been found to have an impact on how 
legitimate individuals perceive it to be (Bruckmüller et al. 2017).  
Here we need to be careful not to use ‘frame’ uncritically as a synonym for ‘ideology’ as 
income inequality is likely to draw different views from those on the political right and left. 
Ideology is a wider concept related to worldviews; however, ideological elements guarantee 
the success of a frame because they resonate with the public, which only amplifies its 
salience. Certainly, framing processes involve the accenting of events, experiences, existing 
beliefs and values, most of which may be associated with ideologies. In this respect, Benford 
and Snow (2000: 59) acknowledge that ‘ideologies constitute cultural background resources 
that can be tapped and exploited for the purpose of constructing collective action frames’. 
Action frames are storied beliefs that inspire, orient and legitimise collective action, and they 
recruit ideology to achieve cultural resonance. But in contrast to ideologies, framing 
processes are not just cognitive processes but are more readily observable activities that 
claims makers and social movements do over and over again for strategic purposes. Take 
the problem of legalising abortion in the US or Germany: Ferree (2003) has shown how the 
issue can be framed as ‘women’s choice’ or as ‘compassion for women in difficulties’ and 
thus appeal to and reach resonance in different streams of opinion. ‘Choice’ is the rallying 
cry among radical core feminists but not sufficient to win, while ‘compassion’ enables 
campaigners to broaden support into the more conservative religious middle ground, and 
thus to win.   
In the framing of a particular topic key elements are used to ‘build’ a particular frame, including 
which actors are speaking on the issue, as well as the slant. Regarding actors, we can 
consider who is seen as a trustworthy source to address the topic, and in the case of an 
emerging social problem, who is identifying the problem, as well as who is seen as 
responsible for resolving it. Secondly, As (Entman 2010) argues, one-sided framing is 
common, where emphasis is placed on some elements while ignoring others, encouraging 
the reader to focus their attention on the evaluative attributes that privilege one perspective 
over others. This gives news stories a particular ‘slant’, or sentiment, in favour of one way to 
interpret the issue. As such, when examining framing it is important to consider the sentiment 
used to construct income inequality as something readers should, or should not, worry about.  
Examining media salience and framing of income inequality, particularly in countries such as 
the UK and the USA which have demonstrated rises in inequality but relatively stable public 
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attitudes towards it, allows us to address our key research question; why has the 
extraordinary rise in income inequality not been treated as a scandal in public discourse?  
 
4. Methodology: Corpus Construction and Analysis 
We examine the UK and the USA because both are English-speaking liberal market 
economies that have experienced sharp rises in wage and income inequalities over the last 
30 years (OECD 2015). Crucially, we examine the discourse over time to better understand 
any agenda-setting effect for the political sphere. Our sampling period was the 25 year period, 
1990-2015.. The selected print media included four daily newspapers and two specialist 
weekly magazines (see Table 1). Note that we do not have reliable annual estimates for the 
Economist nor Forbes, so we will use these corpus items only for our overall content analysis.   
 
Table 1: Selected Print Media 1990-2015 
Type  Newspaper 
Name 
Circulatio
n (2013) 1 
Source # 
articles 
in 
corpus 
Size: no 
of words 
% of 
final 
corpus 
Weekly 
Magazine 
Economist (UK) 221,080 
 
ECON 
data file 
542 654 388 0.9% 
Daily 
Business 
Press 
Financial Times 
(UK) 
275,375 
 
Nexis 
Lexis 
14 976 9 995 437 25.8% 
Daily 
Liberal 
Press 
Guardian (UK) 204,440 
 
Nexis 
Lexis 
20 752 17 832 
761 
35.8% 
Bi-weekly 
Magazine 
Forbes (USA) 931,558 
 
Factiva      
[1997-
2015]  
222 218 067 0.4% 
Daily 
Liberal 
Press 
New York 
Times (USA) 
1,865,318 Nexis 
Lexis 
14 172 14 883 
900 
24.4% 
Daily 
Business 
Press  
Wall Street 
Journal (USA) 
2,378, 827 
 
Factiva  7 321 6 679 011  12.6% 
Total UK + US  Mixed 57 985 32 430 
803 
100 
 
The data was collected using two on-line databases: LexisNexis and Factiva. We divided the 
overall search into four different sized corpora for both quantitative and qualitative analysis. 
For each newspaper (except the Economist), we initially explored the potential corpus size 
by first searching for the term ‘income inequality’. A codebook was developed with primary 
 
1 Circulation numbers taken from the Audit Bureau of Circulations (UK) and the Alliance for Audited Media 
(USA). It should be noted that the general trend is towards a decline in print news circulation, only in part 
compensated by an increasing online presence of the same titles.  
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and secondary keywords, which guided the selection of articles (see Appendix 1). Primary 
keywords included ‘income inequality’ and potential synonyms (such as ‘economic inequality’ 
and ‘pay inequality’), while the secondary keywords included words with a similar meaning 
(i.e., ‘pay differentials’ and ‘wealth distribution’); in total we used 19 keywords.  
(1) Full corpus (N=57985]: The full corpus includes all items retrieved with the full bag of 19 
keywords. This pool of items was uploaded into QDA Miner, a software analysis tool that 
allows for both quantitative and qualitative text analyses. This heterogeneous corpus includes 
many marginally relevant news items, which a human reader might find irrelevant, but 
probably with few omissions or false negatives.  
To compare between corpora using different keyword sets for the semantic field ‘income 
inequality’, two derived sub-corpora of smaller sizes were created. As a single keyword is no 
guarantee to cover the semantic field ‘inequality’, synonyms are needed, not least as topic 
labels might shift over 25 years. A set of keywords casts the net either too narrow or too wide 
to capture ‘relevant’ items. This ultimately involves a balancing act to reach any estimates; 
comparing corpora allows for sensitivity analyses to the width of the semantic net.  
(2) Mid-size corpus (N=20631): The mid-size corpus was developed from the full corpus by 
running proximity plots in QDA Miner to see which five words had the highest co-occurrence 
with the phrase ‘income inequality’ and then compiling all of these into a smaller dataset.2  
(3) Small corpus (N=6063): The small corpus included all articles hitting on ‘income inequality’ 
only and is therefore the most homogeneous and narrow set of items. We have no way of 
estimating its rate of omission, i.e. false negatives.   
In order to analyse shifts over time, two time-variables were added to all files, defining 
significant time periods before and after the financial crisis of 2008 (1990-2007 and 2008-
2015), and considering the initial shape of the issue cycle. 
 (4) Qualitative corpus (N=240): this was constructed in order to examine the framing of 
income inequality through in-depth reading and manual coding. This subset of 240 articles 
was sampled in two batches; the first set of 120 articles included 60 articles (10 from each 
news outlet, pre- and post-crisis) and another 60 articles were selected by examining the co-
occurrence of ‘income inequality’ alongside other keywords in QDA Miner. The top 12 
keywords were selected (covering 20% of articles) and these included ‘economic, education, 
government, health, labour, law, market, minimum wage, pay and poor’. The second set of 
120 articles was sampled randomly; for each news outlet and the two timeframes (1990-2007 
and 2008-2015) we imposed a systematic strategy with variable sampling fractions. For 
example, in a time-window with 145 articles paper X and a target of 10, every 14th item would 
be selected. All sampled items were coded according to a codebook which we developed on 
close-reading of items and in discussions within the team (see Appendix 2). The coding 
categories cover the framing of income inequality, the key actors mentioned, and sentiment 
ratings about ‘inequality’ in the media. The coded data was analysed with SPSS.  
 
2 The five words with highest co-occurrence were inflation, income tax, middle-class, economist and income.  
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5. Findings 
Our findings pertain to (1) the changing media salience and (2) the framing of inequality in 
the British and US American mass media over the period of 1990 to 2015. We will briefly 
state how these were measured and present our results for each of these in sequence.  
Media Salience: The unsteady rise of income inequality 
Our first set of observations on inequality in the press concerns the salience curve as shown 
in Figure 2. We graph here our index of salience in mainstream UK and US ‘broadsheets’ 
over the period 1990 to 2015 on annual figures. We note that the salience curves move more 
or less identically in the UK and the US and as there is little difference here this allows us to 
pool them together. Taking a three-year moving average across all newspapers we can 
identify a bi-model hype cycle on inequality: an initial wave that started in the early 1990s and 
peaked towards the end of the decade before declining into the mid-2000s when a second 
wave emerges. This second wave took off 2005/06, stalled between 2008 and 2009 at the 
level of the previous peak, and rose vigorously into the 2010s to double intensity. Over the 
observation period, publications of the academic research literature on ‘inequality’ increased 
exponentially (Y = 3.1278 e0.1346X; R2 = 0.92).  
To put it another way, our 25 year observation period - a period in which academic research 
on inequality grows continuously - can be divided into three distinct surges with the first peak 
in 1998, a second wave peaking in 2007 before declining, and a third surge from 2010 going 
far beyond anything seen before. During this final surge the news intensity doubled over five 
years. That said, the sheer scale of the rise in coverage after the ‘Great Recession of 2008-
9’ means that we will make a simple distinction between the period before and after the 
recession for our later analysis. Overall, we conclude that inequality takes the shape of a bi-
model hype cycle as schematised in figure 2 with little deviation between UK and US: an 
initial surge in coverage that sounds the alarm on inequality, followed by a gradual decline; a 
second surge takes the issue into a new stage, possibly bringing a resolution of the problem, 
at least according to the issue-attention model. However, as our observations end in 2015, 
we cannot be certain whether this second surge reached its peak or continued to date. Our 
three-phase hype model predicts however, that the narrative will have shifted across these 
phases; we will come back to this below with our frame analysis.    
Figure 2: 
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Notes: On the left, the growth of scholarly economic literature in ‘income inequality’; SSCI frequency 
of publications on ‘income inequality’, 1990 – 2015, with the log fit curve. UK and US-Index show the 
salience of ‘inequality’ relative to newshole indexed to 2015=100; the dashed line is 3-year moving 
average on the all-Index of news, combining UK + US news. On the right, a stylized bi-modal hype-
cycle of public discourse X in relation to academic publications (dashed line) on X showing the three 
phases of ‘sounding the alarm’, ‘calming down’, and ‘sorting the problem’. 
 
A second set of observations on media salience of inequality arises from comparing the peak 
of news with other issue attention cycles over the period. We ask ourselves, is the peak of 
2014 in the coverage of inequality a large peak or not? We find that in 2014, The Guardian 
carries about 2000 (89), the FT about 950 (172), the NYT about 1450 (526), and WSJ about 
650 (149) items on ‘inequality’; this according to our full corpus (with numbers in parentheses 
from the small corpus). This indicates that ‘inequality’ has consistently gained in salience 
since 1990s in Britain and in the US, and in all newspapers. What was in 1990s at most an 
occasional news item on a monthly cycle, is by 2015 clearly a regular new item on a weekly 
if not daily cycle. Clearly the salience of inequality has increased; but how hot exactly is the 
topic, especially when compared with others?   
Here we are able to compare inequality with other topics that indicates social problems in 
modern society, such as global warming, the emergence of biotechnology and controversies 
over GM food and stem cell cloning, and the emergence of the internet and social media with 
controversies over surveillance capacities and privacy protection. Evidence from Britain 
shows that climate change news might have peaked in 2009 with about 4,217 items in the 
London Times (Tennant 2012). Biotechnology reached its news peak in 1999 during the 
‘great food debate’ with 1,666 items in The Times (Bauer 2015: 188), the coverage of the 
‘internet’ peaked in 2000 with 7,329 items (average across three newspapers, (Bauer 2015: 
137)). Further comparisons are ‘the Gulf War’ in 1990 with 4,185 items, or the ‘credit crunch’ 
of 2008 with 5,320 items, both in The Guardian (Bauer 2015: 83).  Considering these UK 
base-line comparators, ‘inequality’ falls far short of surges in news coverage of other topic 
such as the internet, climate change, the Gulf War of 1990, or the credit crunch of 2008. It is 
in fact more in line maybe with GM food in the late 1990s but only if we consider the wider 
semantic field of the term. Using the stricter term of ‘single keyword search’, inequality only 
amounts to one tenth the ‘Great food debate’ of 1999. 
How might we explain this surge in media interest over 25 years? One possible answer might 
be that the increased news value simply is a direct reaction to rising levels of inequality in 
society. As inequality grows, so also does media attention and public interest. To investigate 
this possibility, we compiled data for the Gini coefficient for both the UK and the USA between 
1990 and 2015. We found that the Gini increased noticeably for the USA across this period 
(41.8 to 45.4) but remained at roughly the same level in the UK (33.9 to 34.7). Even if the 
long-term in media coverage had corresponded to the rise in the US Gini coefficient this still 
raises the question of why there were fluctuations in the coverage of income inequality in the 
New York Times and in The Wall Street Journal. To put it another way, rising inequality cannot 
explain rising media attention because inequality rose only in one of the two countries while 
the Gini index rises regularly or stalls.  
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We conclude, that with regard to media salience: inequality news does not differ in intensity 
between the US and the UK (Figure 2). But, in contrast to McCall’s analysis (2013) we find 
that it certainly increases in salience, particularly towards the end of the period. That said, 
inequality does not reach the critical mass that other news cycles have reached over the 
period. It compares at best with the GM food debate of the 1990s in Europe in terms of news 
volume, but it falls far short of events such as climate change, the credit crunch of 2008 or 
the Gulf War of 1990. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that the issue-attention cycle of 
inequality resembles that of a hype cycle often observed in scientific technological 
developments. As it grows within the academic literature, it unwinds a bi-modal surge of news 
in three phases: an initial alarm is followed by a calmer phase, after which the surge resumes 
into a different stage. For inequality, we find a first surge between 1990 and 199 that falls 
back in 2004/5, and a second surge  in 2006 that drops back to 1998 levels in 2007/08 before 
re-doubling in intensity to 2015. Overall, the issue-attention cycle of inequality looks more like 
a techno-scientific hype-cycle than the kind of fully politicised issue-attention cycle we see 
with climate change.  We conclude, that inequality has not yet reached the critical mass that 
is necessary to define a new social problem. But this leaves us with our second research 
question: has the framing of the media discourse of inequality shifted over time and if so, 
might this be consistent with an emerging politicisation of an issue-attention cycle?     
 
6. Media Framing of Income Inequality 
As indicated earlier, we are analysing the shifting narrative of inequality by examining four 
dimensions over time: the inequality frames, the emotional tone of the stories, the political 
slant of news coverage, and the sponsors or actors that are positioned in the discourse.  
Different Frames of Income Inequality 
A growing body of scientific research on an abstract topic is, of course, unlikely to generate 
headlines. Instead, the topic must resonate with journalists who, as gatekeepers, deem it 
newsworthy. Here a more fine-grained analysis of the actual news stories can provide 
insights into what journalists and their editors’ think will capture public imagination. These 
secondary guesses of news value are our analytic frames of inequality. Each frame 
designates a complex narrative of what inequality is, who might be blamed for it, and what 
should be done about it, if anything. From close reading and qualitative analysis, we identified 
eight such frames (n=240; see Appendix 3 for frames and examples).  
Considering two periods of pre and post credit crunch 2008, we find that the framing of 
inequality is indeed changing taking a different emphasis pre- and post -crisis. Generally 
speaking, the pre-period frames try to understand the phenomenon while post-crisis the 
emphasis is on how to manage it. Figure 3 shows the shifting proportions of each frame: 
Conceptualization and Type of Change had more than 70% of their mentions pre-crisis, while 
Attribution Level and Policy Making, had similar weight in the second period. Given this shift 
in frame structure, it is worth dwelling on their content.  
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Figure 3 : The shifting distribution of ‘inequality frames’ in the press pre- and post-
crisis of 2008 
 
Notes: qualitative sample, N=240; pre = 1990-2007, post = 2008-2015. 
 
Conceptualisation: As inequality is a relational concept, it is no surprise to find that the 
discussions are pre-occupied with indicators and comparisons. This frame covers 
comparison between the extremes of the pay distribution which serves to make an abstract 
concept that is not evident in everyday life easier to understand. ‘Top versus the bottom’ was 
a regular reference, where the top ten per cent of the income distribution was compared to 
the bottom ten percent. Another comparison, which featured initially in the US press was the 
ratio of ‘CEO to worker pay’; worker pay being the median earning employee (i.e., “the 
compensation of top CEOs was about 35 times the pay of the average employee in the mid-
1970s; by 1990 the ratio had risen to 120”, WSJ July 3rd, 1992). Temporal comparisons also 
come in here to highlight growing income inequality (i.e., “If we want to get a valid measure 
of U.S. trends over the past two decades, all the same people in 1979--wherever they lived-
-should be compared with all the same people in the U.S. work force in 1999”, The Guardian, 
April, 1991). It was of course research by economists that fed media coverage, with the result 
that a previously obscure measure such as the ‘Gini coefficient’ entered the public discourse 
to indicate growing inequality.  
Type of Change: Another frame of inequality reflects something of an early consensus among 
economists on the causes of inequality. In this narrative, skill-biased technological change, 
notably in the form of computerisation, creates strong demand for skilled employees who can 
exploit the new technology. When combined with the subsequent skill shortages, the wages 
of these workers rise considerably. At the same time, developments in automation make it 
difficult for those in more repetitive forms of work to maintain a decent wage as their jobs are 
eliminated. And so it is through such skill biases of technology that wage inequality is 
exacerbated (Acemoglu 2002). The result is that journalists either point to technological 
change ‘as the main driver of the growing earnings gap between high-skilled and low-skilled 
in the US and the UK’ [FT, October, 2004] or else explain the rise in inequality as the ‘result 
of the demand for skilled, college-educated workers in an ever more high-technology 
workplace’ [NYT, January, 2002]. Our evidence [not shown] indicates that this was the frame 
most commonly used. 
78%
72%
67%
63% 60%
52%
25% 25%22%
28%
33%
38% 40%
48%
75% 75%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
III Working paper 53                                                          McGovern, Obradovic, Bauer 
14 
 
 
Another discourse on inequality that features in economic explanations is that of Geography. 
This frame compares level of inequality in different locations, and examines differential impact 
across the labour force as ‘the earnings of the unskilled have been far more exposed to the 
pressures of low-wage competition from developing countries’ [FT, 42344, 1995]. As in the 
case of technology, rising inequality is attributed to abstract forces that seem both impersonal 
and inevitable. This sense of inevitability was also echoed in the Market frame which 
presented inequality as a necessary feature of a capitalist market economy; this narrative 
can also argue that this market effect is necessary even if it is also viewed as scandalous.  
Attribution Level: A prominent frame of the post-crisis period discusses the level at which 
income inequality originated as a problem, and thus where remedies should be focused. Here 
articles ranged from attributing inequality to the behaviours of individuals (i.e., “A better and 
more compassionate policy to fight income inequality would be helping the poor realize that 
the most important decision they can make is to stay in school, get married and have children 
-- in that order”, WSJ January 23rd, 2014) to focusing on macro-level changes needed, such 
as cultural, ideological or structural changes. One side of the argument is neo-classical 
economics which assumes the market for labour is as competitive as the market for apple 
and pears and that workers with different characteristics, notably education and skill training, 
would earn different wages. By contrast, the institutional argument claims that ‘the game is 
rigged’ as structural barriers prevent the market from operating fairly. It follows that politics 
has to address the basic premises of how a market economy operates. 
Policy Making: This frame links inequality to policies or to the rhetoric of political actors. Here 
we distinguished between old and new policies as we wanted to see if inequality was framed 
in such a way that it would suggest new kinds of policy solutions. This brings us to a core 
finding, which is that the way income inequality was presented did not lend itself to the 
creation of a radical new frame of economic injustice. This then meant that no ‘novel solutions 
for a new problem’ were proposed but rather, inequality was absorbed by the existing policy 
repertoire for dealing with poverty. That is, the discourse was dominated by such established 
measures as the raising of the minimum wage and the reform of the tax system for the low 
paid. We could identify no substantial shift in the discourse that addressed inequality in toto.  
Sentiment of Income Inequality 
To examine the overall tone of the reportage on income inequality, we coded the ‘temper’ of 
each article using four categories: Negative, Neutral, Positive and Contested and examined 
each for the presence of morality-laden words (i.e. ‘inequality is not morally excusable’). For 
example, a neutral temper, most common with 42%, would entail articles that simply report 
statistics on the rise or fall of income inequality without judgement while contested articles 
(18%) would present different sides of contradicting arguments without taking sides (e.g. 
“income inequality within the nation may rise but global inequality probably declines, 
especially if the new arrivals send money back home”, NYT, 2014). Positively (8%) or 
negatively (32%) tempered articles include value-laden and moral words in either direction. 
Significantly for our purposes, the neutrally and negatively tempered articles were the most 
common.   
We examined changes in temper pre and post- crisis (Figure 4). Here we see that Contested 
framing declined over time, which is consistent with earlier findings indicating that the pre-
crisis period focused more on the conceptualization and measurement of income inequality. 
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However, we do observe a rise from pre- to post-crisis in both negatively or positively 
tempered articles, which indicates a growing polarization in the framing of income inequality, 
with articles presenting less balanced positions on the topic and instead taking a more 
either/or approach to the presentation of the topic.  
Figure 4: Comparing news temper of income inequality pre- and post-crisis in 
percentages of items (n=240) 
 
 
Similarly, we see an increase in morality-related keywords in the post-crisis dataset. Figure 
5 illustrates the increase in four morality-laden words identified in the qualitative dataset; 
scandal, ill, obscene and appalling. Examples of these include discussing income inequality 
as an ‘economic and social ill’ (Forbes, 2005; NYT 2007) and ‘greater inequality, apart from 
an appalling human cost...’ (Guardian, 1992).  
 
Figure 5: Comparing presence of morality keywords in articles on income inequality 
pre- and post-crisis in percentages of items (n=240); inequality is ‘a scandal’, ‘ill’, 
‘obscene’ or ‘appalling’. 
 
29
41
7
23
36
42
10 12
0
10
20
30
40
50
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
11%
23%
2%
4%
39%
44%
5% 6%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
Scandal Ill Obscene Appalling
Pre-crisis Post-crisis
III Working paper 53                                                          McGovern, Obradovic, Bauer 
16 
 
 
Political Slant of Income Inequality 
We also assess whether the slant of the article is politically left or right leaning; for this we 
create a simple index, the rating of right-leaning [0-5] minus the rating of left-leaning [0-5]; 
this yields an index [range -4 to +4; M= -0.31; SD=1.41; MD=0; n=135]. Our analysis indicates 
that more of the frames are associated with the Left than with the Right; the association 
between frames and Left slant (Cramer’s V = .32**) is stronger than with Right slant (V = .26 
n.s.). Also, the ‘attribution level’ frame, in which inequality is ascribed to either individual or 
institutional causes, is strongly related to the Left (see Figure 6). That is, the tendency in this 
frame is to counter the argument that inequality is a simply a problem of individuals, their skill 
level or personality traits when it is society or the system that is rigged’.  
Figure 6 shows how the political loading of frames shifts from pre- to post-2008 crisis. Pre-
crisis there is an association of frames with political slant (V = .40**); for post-crisis this 
association is less clear (V = .38 n.s).  Before 2008 ‘attribution’, ‘growth’, ‘market’ and ‘type’ 
frames tend towards a Left argument, this is less the case after 2008. Post-crisis 
‘geographical’, ‘markets’, growth, and ‘equality’ arguments tend to recruit more of a Right 
position. Overall, post-crisis these frames of inequality lose their clear political positioning, as 
both Left and Right are equally inclined to make use of the same frames.   
Figure 6: Average political slant of inequality reportage in different frames, and pre 
and post-crisis 
 
Notes: qualitative sample n=240. The slant scale ranges -4 to +4, with negative scores indicating left-
liberal leaning, positive scores indicating right-market leaning. 
 
Sponsors of Income Inequality Discourse 
Finally, we are able to distinguish between applied economists working in think tanks and 
international organisations, academic economists working in universities, and party 
politicians (both left and right). We also investigated references to trade unions since they 
have traditionally been a force against inequality. What we found points to a discourse on 
income inequality with a clear Brahminic quality. That is, the discourse was generated mostly 
from within the ranks of experts and frequently  by economists of different kinds (49%) though 
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politicians have some presence (43%). Examining the relative frequency of the different 
discourse sponsors over time (Figure 7) we find the professional or applied economists were 
the leading sponsors pre-crisis, with academic economists becoming slightly more involved 
in the early 2000s. Again, what is especially telling is political sponsorship did not move into 
the dominant position in a way that would indicate that the issue has moved from being a 
marginal concern to one that is squarely on the political agenda. Indeed, their degree of 
sponsorship is surprisingly unchanged even towards the end of the period when there is a 
dramatic increase in coverage of the topic.  
Figure 7: Comparing presence of actors in articles on income inequality pre- and post-
crisis in percentages of items (n=193, total articles with relevant sponsors). 
 
 
Another indication that the politicisation of inequality is limited comes from our evidence on 
trade unions. We find that the number of times that trade unions are mentioned across the 
period is relatively small. Though there is an increase in the number of articles on income 
inequality that mention unions after the 2008 crisis it could not be described as a major surge. 
In sum, there is nothing to indicate that the public discussion of income inequality has 
engaged the range of sponsors that might be associated with the kind of agenda setting that 
would characterize a new social problem. 
 
7. Summary and Discussion: Why is there no ‘Tawney moment’? 
So why has the rise in income inequality not been accompanied by a change in public 
attitudes? We contend that part of the answer has to lie in the way the issue is covered by 
the mass media since it remains a key source of information about the economy. Mass media 
coverage of inequality was examined along two dimensions, salience and framing.  
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a) Coverage of inequality news increased from 1990 to 2015 in the UK as well as in 
the US. It ran at the same levels of intensity in the UK and US newspapers and 
takes a similar trajectory over time.  
b) At its peak in 2014, media attention levels could be compared to the European GM 
food debate of the late 1990s but it falls far short of peak news intensity recruited 
by the internet, climate change, the credit crunch and the Gulf War.  
c) The mass media have limited processing capacity so a topic is likely to fluctuate 
over time and present itself as an issue cycle with a characteristic shape. The issue 
cycle of inequality shows two peaks and a trough: following the growth of academic 
research literature on inequality, we find an initial news alarm between 1990 and 
1998, calming down to 2004/5, and a second stronger surge between 2006 and 
2015, interrupted by the credit crunch of 2008. Overall, this issue cycle resembles 
a techno-scientific hype-cycle more than to fully politicised attention cycle such as 
that of climate change. 
d) There is no direct correlation between changing measures of inequality as in Gini 
index and mass media coverage of inequality, neither in UK nor US; public 
attention to inequality needs to be understood as a societal response to a 
‘challenge’, rather than a mechanical reaction to economic change.   
We conclude, that inequality has not yet reached the critical mass that is necessary to 
become the kind of full-blown scandal that defines a new social problem in society. No 
Tawney moment has appeared, at least as yet, over inequality in the 21st century. Even so, 
it is still worth considering if the framing of the media discourse of inequality shifted over time 
and, if so, whether this might be consistent with at least the emerging politicisation of an 
issue-attention cycle.     
e) The framing of inequality discourse is shifting from the initial surge pre-2008 to the 
second surge post-2008. Initially, the narratives focus on describing the key 
concept of inequality by using measurement comparisons and by explaining it in 
terms of an inevitable technology wage bias. Post crisis 2008, the discourse moves 
to frames that discuss political interventions at national and international level.  
f) The alarm phase of inequality of the 1990s and early 2000s is dominated by expert 
voices; these are somewhat in retreat post-crisis of 2008, and are balanced 
somewhat by political voices. But the Brahminic nature of public discourse persists.  
g) The fact that the different frames are more closely associated with political Left-
Right slant pre-crisis than post-crisis 2008, suggests that the politicisation of 
inequality remained within clear limits over the period 1990 to 2015.  
These observations on salience and framing of inequality suggests that while the issue 
gained in salience when it went through an alarm phase in the 1990s it has not been able to 
mobilise strong and distinct political voices promoting a radical new framing of the problem. 
This lack of mobilisation hints at a lack of resonance between the problem and the public 
both the UK and the USA. Why so?   
How to explain the absence of a Tawney moment?  
Rather than directly explaining this absence, we want to list a number of plausible 
explanations for it. Our observed facts regarding salience and framing are at least consistent 
with some explanatory inferences.  
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Firstly, we must acknowledge that our findings differ from McCall (2013) in that we not only 
have evidence of increased media attention for the UK but also for the US where her research 
is based. So the fact that income is an abstract concept that may be difficult to explain has 
not stopped it gaining substantial attention. However, we think her argument that it is hindered 
by the controversial nature of the most obvious remedy, namely income redistribution, is 
worth taking more seriously. 
Secondly, and relatedly, we find that the framing of inequality is controversial in that it is 
absorbed by the established conflict between the political right and left over the way they 
view economic matters. Of course, the science of climate change was also contested but with 
the difference that ‘inequality’ is but a continuation of an ancient political contest between the 
right and the left; that is, between those who want to regulate markets and contain the 
excesses of capitalism and those who want to liberate markets to generate prosperity and 
wealth. Similarly, the ‘attribution’ frame, which contrasts individual versus institutional causes 
of inequality, pits a philosophy of individualism and individual failure or success against a 
discourse that presents inequality as a systemic feature of capitalism in which the game is 
rigged to favour the rich.   
Thirdly, when it came to policy solutions it was therefore no surprise to find that the frames 
collapsed onto policies that were already part of the repertoires deployed by the left and right. 
These included, for instance, raising the minimum wage, increasing taxes on the rich, and 
investing in public education, especially in relation to new technology. We could find no 
evidence of a emergence of a new frame of economic injustice that was parallel to the 
environmental injustice frame that helped to mobilize the environmental movement (Taylor 
2000). Specifically, no master frame of economic injustice emerged that brought together 
discourses on inequality into a new paradigm that suggested new kinds of policy measures.  
Fourthly, compared to the issue of the ‘environment’, inequality does not seem to either recruit 
or form new actors. The discourse of inequality is led by social scientists, notably by 
economists who are based in agencies such OECD or the World Bank or at universities. If 
an issue is to gain attention and to become a recognized social problem, it needs to widen 
its field of actors. Again, this contrasts with the developments around the environment which 
produced ecologists in Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth, as well as in Green parties in 
many countries, and, perhaps most impressively, on the international stage in the form of the 
IPCC (Radkau 2014). Also, when compared to the ecology where large scale disasters in the 
1970s and 1980s  concretised an abstract problem in the public eye (e.g. Exxon Valdez oil 
spill; Seveso or Bhopal chemical disasters), no such scandals of magnitude usher in the 
discourse of inequality beyond a temporary outcry about bankers during the financial  crisis 
of 2008. However, the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020, which brings to light massive national 
and international inequality, could have the effect of changing this situation; but this is a 
matter of follow-up as it falls outside our period of observation.    
Finally, when we examined whether politicians, trade unions and religious organisations 
became a significant voice on inequality, we found that neither politicians nor trade unions 
became prominent actors in a way that would indicate social mobilization around the issue. 
Instead, the dominance  of economists, which was somewhat balanced by politicians in years 
after the 2008 crisis, indicates that the public discourse of income inequality seems 
Brahminic, that is, it takes the form of the popularization of an arcane science that is unable 
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to generate resonances with the wider public. As with ‘evolutionary psychology’ during the 
1990s or ‘sexology’ in the early 20th century, an initial hype-cycle of public attention allows an 
academic field to grow on a newly found flow of funding and PhDs. In sum, the discourse on 
income inequality has not generated a Tawney moment up to 2015 because it has been 
unable to break through the left-right schemata that are the habitual frame of mind in the UK 
and US.    
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Keywords guiding data collection 
Primary Keywords (12) Secondary Keywords (6) Tertiary Keywords (1) 
Income Inequality Inequality OR income 
distribution 
Inequality OR income 
distribution OR wage 
differentials 
Inequality Inequality OR Wage 
distribution 
 
Salary Inequality Inequality OR Wealth 
distribution 
 
Wage inequality  Inequality OR Wage 
differentials 
 
Economic inequality Inequality OR Salary 
differentials  
 
Compensation inequality Inequality OR Pay 
differentials  
 
Pay inequality   
Income AND inequality   
Salary AND inequality   
Wage AND Inequality   
Economic AND Inequality   
Pay AND Inequality   
 
Appendix 2: Qualitative codebook 
Article number ID number 
Year 1990-2015 
Newspaper 1 = Guardian UK 
2 = Economist [UK weekly] 
3 = New York Times US 
4 = Financial Times UK 
5 = Wall Street Journal US 
6 = Forbes  [US weekly] 
Focal3: 
Is income 
inequality the focus 
of the story?  
1. Yes  
2. No 
 
Criteria for Yes: 
1. Income, inequality, rich/poor in title, first three sentences and/or 
conclusion.  
Frame: 1. Concept 
 
3 Depending on whether an article was coded 1 (Yes) or 2 (No) it was either analysed in full or discarded from in-depth 
analysis. 
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How is income 
inequality framed 
in the discourse? 
2. Equality 
3. Market 
4. Economic Growth 
5. Attribution Level 
6. Type of Change 
7. Geographical Level 
8. Policy Making 
9. Other/ NA  
Temper: 
How is II 
discussed?  
1. Negative 
2. Neutral 
3. Positive 
4. Contested 
9. Other/ NA 
Measurement: 
What kind of 
measure of II is 
used in the article? 
1. Top-bottom comparison (Richest 10% vs. poorest 10%) 
2. Temporal (1970s v. 1990s) 
3. Gini coefficient 
4. International (comparing countries) 
5. CEO-worker comparison 
6. Other 
9. None 
Sponsors: 
What actors are 
mentioned in the 
article in relation to 
II? 
1. Politicians (Left-wing) 
2. Politicians (Right-wing) 
3. Economists (University-affiliated) 
4. Economists (Organization-affiliated) 
5. Other 
Type of argument 
(Entman 2004): 
 
1. Descriptive only  
2. Descriptive and analytical 
3. Full: Descriptive, analytical and policy recommendations 
9. Other  
 
Appendix 3: Income Inequality Frames and Examples 
Frame Description Anchor 1 Anchor 2 
1. Concept Coded for when 
articles debate (or 
propose) how 
income inequality 
should be 
conceptualized; 
top-bottom 
comparison, 
family-individual 
incomes, country-
comparison etc. 
and the various 
results (rising v. 
declining) 
Concept: About 
Extremes 
 
The 
conceptualization is 
anchored in 
‘extremes’; top 10% 
v. bottom 10%, rich 
v. poor.  
Concept: About 
everyone 
 
The 
conceptualization 
of income inequality 
is anchored in more 
broadly such as in 
household income 
comparisons, GINI 
and changes 
across time.  
2. Equality Discussed in 
relation to either 
Equality: of 
Opportunity 
Equality: of 
Outcome 
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providing equal 
opportunity or 
equal outcome - 
some arguing that 
equal opportunity 
is already 
available but 
should not stifle 
intelligence and 
hard work, while 
others argue that 
true 
egalitarianism 
comes from equal 
outcomes. 
 
Equality is about 
creating an equal 
starting-point for all, 
but not in regulating 
outcome (which is 
perceived as 
socialism).  
 
Equality is about 
managing 
outcomes, where 
differences 
between social 
strata need to be 
remedied by 
government 
intervention.  
3. Market Income inequality 
is discussed in 
relation to market 
forces either as an 
inevitable 
outcome or as 
harmful for 
individuals and 
society.  
Market: Necessary 
evil 
 
Discussed as a 
necessary evil of a 
capitalist society, 
arguing that income 
inequality policy 
measures would 
only stifle economic 
productivity and 
growth with which 
would only make 
things far worse. 
Market: Scandal 
 
Discussed as a 
scandal or social 
evil when social ills 
(such as poverty, 
unemployment, 
health-care access 
etc.) were related to 
growing income 
inequality. 
4. Economic 
+++++++++++Growth 
Discussed as a 
trade-off between 
income inequality 
and economic 
growth. Jeopardy 
argument – 
tackling income 
inequality would 
risk economic 
decline. Or rising 
income inequality 
slows down 
growth.   
Economic Growth: 
Freedom 
 
When articles 
emphasize 
economic growth as 
more important 
than dealing with 
inequality as it risks 
slowing down 
productivity and 
economic growth. 
Economic Growth: 
Regulation  
 
When articles 
construct the need 
for institutional and 
government 
regulations on both 
social and 
economic issues so 
that income 
inequality does not 
rise, but also as a 
way to promote 
growth.  
5.Attribution Level When article 
discussed 
whether II was an 
issue needing 
either individual 
remedies or, 
Attribution Level: 
Individual problem 
 
The scale 
‘individualized’ 
when an article 
Attribution Level:  
Institutional 
problem 
 
The Scale of 
income inequality 
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alternatively, 
structural change.  
 
placed emphasis on 
making poor people 
richer, helping them 
make better 
decisions etc. 
without addressing 
larger structural 
causes for their 
predicament.  
was considered 
structural when it 
was discussed 
within the broader 
context of societal 
and institutional 
forces and actors. 
 
  
6. Type of Change When income 
inequality was 
caused by 
technological 
change leading to 
the need for more 
computer-friendly 
skilled workers 
with  less need for 
manual labor etc. 
Or else change is 
viewed as an 
impersonal and 
neutral 
phenomenon.  
Type of Change: 
Neutral 
 
Pace of change 
influences trends in 
income inequality; 
slower change 
leads to more 
stable income 
differences and 
equality. fast 
change produces 
noticeable 
inequalities  
Type of Change:  
Skill Bias 
 
Technology is 
biased towards skill 
and education, 
meaning that 
technology favours 
high-skilled and 
highly educated 
members of 
society.  
7.Geographical Level When article 
places a nation’s 
growing income 
inequality in a 
global context, 
(using 
international 
comparisons) to 
illustrate a general 
/ natural trend 
among affluent 
nations, or to 
argue that while 
national income 
inequality may be 
growing 
nationally, 
globally it has 
been decreasing 
(thus being a 
defence of II). 
Geographical 
Level: Global 
phenomenon 
 
 
Framing income 
inequality as a 
global trend.  
Geographical 
Level: National 
phenomenon 
 
Framing income 
inequality as a 
national-level 
phenomenon, 
focusing on within-
country changes.  
 
 
8.  Policy Making When articles 
discuss income 
inequality in a 
largely political 
frame, meaning 
Policy Making New 
policy remedies 
 
Cap CEO pay, 
restricting the rich 
Policy Making: 
Existing policy 
remedies 
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the issue is linked 
either to certain 
policies (wages, 
taxes etc.) or the 
rhetoric of specific 
political actors. 
e.g., Raising 
minimum wage, 
strengthening trade 
unions, progressive 
taxation or anti- 
poverty measures. 
 
 
